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and	 their	 families	 and	 friends	 are	wrestling	with	 gut‐wrenching	 conflicts	 that	 can	
arise	when	the	health	care	team	believes	that	treatment	should	not	be	provided	and	
the	patient’s	loved	ones	believe	that	it	should.		Occasionally,	details	of	specific	cases	
spill	 over	 into	 the	media,	 engaging	 the	public	 in	 the	often‐heated	debate.	 	 Talk	 of	
‘unrealistic	expectations’,	‘false	hope’,	and	‘futility’	abounds	and	tests	for	defensible	
withholding	or	withdrawal	of	treatment,	such	as	‘a	reasonable	prospect	of	returning	
a	 patient	 to	 a	 meaningful	 quality	 of	 life’	 and	 ‘accepted	 medical	 practice’,	 are	
proposed.			
	
In	 this	paper,	we	will	 attempt	 to	 take	a	 step	back	 from	 the	drama	and	vitriol	 and	
suggest	 an	 approach	 to	 law	 and	 policy	 reform	 grounded	 in	 identification	 of	 core	
values,	careful	conceptual	analysis,	and	a	dose	of	humility	and	pragmatism.		To	that	
end,	 we	 reflect	 on	 the	 core	 values	 that	 do	 (or	 should)	 underpin	 a	 regulatory	
framework	for	deciding	on	whether	potentially	life‐sustaining	treatment	should	be	
withheld	or	withdrawn.		These	values	and	the	ways	to	balance	these	values	against	
each	 other	 are	 drawn	 from	 legislation,	 the	 common	 law	 and	 conventions	 and	
treaties	that	have	been	ratified	by	Australia	and	New	Zealand.1	We	then	summarise	
the	 legal	 context	 in	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 within	 which	 the	 ethical	 debate	
about	 the	 unilateral	 withholding	 and	 withdrawal	 of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	

























of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment.	 	 This	 is	 where	 a	 doctor	 withholds	 or	
withdraws	 treatment	 without	 consent	 from	 a	 patient	 or	 patient’s	 substitute	
decision‐maker	(‘sdm’)2	(where	the	patient	lacks	capacity),	or	authorization	from	a	
court	 or	 tribunal,	 or	 by	 operation	 of	 a	 statute	 or	 justifiable	 government	 or	








such	 laws	 and	 policies	 to	 be	 appropriate.	 	 Just	 what	 the	 regulatory	 framework	
should	 look	like	requires	a	step	back	to	consider	the	values	that	are	 implicated	 in,	
and	 should	 ground,	 law	 and	 policy	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 unilateral	
withholding	 and	withdrawal	 of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment.	 	 In	 our	 view,	
these	 values	 include	 life,	 autonomy,	 equality,	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 distributive	 justice,	
procedural	 fairness,	 access	 to	 justice,	 conscience	 and	 humility.	 	 A	 detailed	
examination	of	each	of	these	values	and	the	balancing	of	them	against	each	other	is	
not	possible	in	a	paper	of	this	length	but	we	note	the	legal	sources	for	each	of	them	







Our	 starting	 point	 is	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 value	 of	 human	 life	 is	
recognised	by	the	common	law.		In	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland,	the	House	of	Lords	
accepted	 that	 ‘sanctity	 of	 life’	 formed	 part	 of	 the	 English	 legal	 system3	 and	











and	New	 Zealand	 (and	 indeed	 in	many	 common	 law	 jurisdictions	 throughout	 the	
world)	 also	 recognises	 that	 the	 value	 of	 an	 individual’s	 life	 can	 sometimes	 be	
outweighed	by	the	disvalue	of	their	suffering.		In	other	words,	a	person	may	decide	
that	 life	 is	 no	 longer	 worth	 living.	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 law	 allows	 a	 competent	






sustaining	 treatment	 should	 therefore	 recognise	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 life,	 the	
possibility	of	instrumental	value	for	life	(for	the	individual	and	those	the	individual	








































Zealand	 common	 law.	 	 For	 example,	 Gummow,	 Heydon	 and	 Hayne	 JJ	 in	 Stuart	 v	
Kirkland‐Veenstra	 recognised,	 in	 the	 context	of	 a	negligence	action,	 ‘an	underlying	
value	of	the	common	law	which	gives	primacy	to	personal	autonomy’8	and	observed	
that	personal	autonomy	is	‘a	value	that	informs	much	of	the	common	law’.9		There	is	
also	Australian	authority	 for	 this	proposition	 specifically	 in	 the	end	of	 life	 setting.	
For	 example,	 in	 Brightwater	 Care	 Group	 (Inc)	 v	 Rossiter,	 Martin	 CJ	 refers	 to	 the	
‘common	 law	principle	 of	 autonomy	 and	 self‐determination’10	 and	 also	 notes	 that	
the	 principle	 is	 ‘well	 established	 at	 common	 law’.11	 In	 that	 case,	 a	 man	 with	
quadriplegia	 was	 being	 kept	 alive	 by	 the	 delivery	 of	 artificial	 nutrition	 and	
hydration	through	a	tube	into	his	stomach.		He	was	not	in	the	terminal	phase	of	an	
illness	 and,	 provided	 the	 treatment	 was	 given,	 he	 would	 have	 continued	 to	 live.		
Nevertheless,	 he	 decided	 that	 he	 no	 longer	 wished	 to	 receive	 such	 medical	
treatment	and	 the	Western	Australian	Supreme	Court	 recognised	his	 right	 to	 self‐
determination	by	declaring	that	it	would	be	lawful	to	withdraw	the	treatment.	
	





context	 of	 refusals	 of	 treatment,	 autonomy	 has	 generally	 been	 interpreted	 in	
Australia	and	New	Zealand	as	the	narrow	right	to	prevent	physical	interference	with	
one’s	bodily	integrity.15		This	is	what	requires	a	refusal	of	treatment	to	be	respected	




























respected	 and	 acted	 upon	 and	 would	 include	 the	 ability	 to	 determine	 that	 they	
receive	particular	treatment.16				It	is	this	latter	view	of	autonomy	that	we	consider	





our	 society	 generally	 and	 in	 medical	 decision‐making	 (particularly	 end	 of	 life	
decision‐making),	that	to	exclude	it	would	be	indefensible.		If	the	narrower	view	of	
autonomy	set	out	above	 is	 taken,	 the	concept	of	autonomy	can	play	no	role	 in	 the	
debate	 about	 unilateral	withholding	 and	withdrawal.	 	While	 the	 narrow	 view	 has	
received	firm	and	unwavering	support	in	law,	it	is	not	sufficient	here	as	we	are	not	
considering	 refusals	 of	 treatment.	 	 Therefore	 it	 is	 only	 if	we	 contemplate	 a	wider	
view	 of	 autonomy	 that	 this	 concept	 can	 play	 a	 role.	 	 Accordingly,	 we	 include	
autonomy	as	a	relevant	value	for	designing	a	model	for	decision‐making	in	this	area	
and	by	this	we	mean	autonomy	in	the	wider	sense	of	having	one’s	will	respected	and	
acted	 upon.	 	 That	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 a	 person’s	 right	 of	 self‐determination	 should	





dealing	 with	 past	 autonomy	 as	 expressed	 through	 advance	 directives	 and	 sdms	
where	the	sdm	is	able	to	represent	the	patient’s	wishes	or	values.		For	example,	an	
individual	may	be	 an	Orthodox	 Jew	and	believe	 that	one	must	pursue	all	 possible	
means	to	prolong	life	and	so	might	wish	treatment	even	in	the	face	of	a	persistent	
vegetative	state.	 	Or	an	 individual	may	believe	that	 it	would	be	very	important	 for	
the	psychological	well‐being	of	her	children	to	be	able	to	say	goodbye	to	her	while	
she	is	still	alive	even	if	she	is	unconscious,	and	so	she	would	want	ongoing	treatment	
until	 such	 time	 as	 her	 children	 could	 get	 to	 the	 hospital	 to	 say	 goodbye.	 	 An	
individual	might	believe	that	Chinese	remedies	can	cure	cancer	and	want	aggressive	


























these	 countries	 to	 the	 value	 of	 equality.	 	 Over	 recent	 decades,	 Australia	 and	New	
Zealand	have	become	signatories	to	various	conventions	and	treaties,	including	the	
Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities,	which	support	and	promote	
the	 value	 of	 equality,17	 and	 have	 enacted	 human	 rights18	 and	 anti‐discrimination	
legislation.19	 These	 instruments	 aim	 not	 only	 to	 prevent	 discrimination	 against	
people	with	disabilities,	but	 they	also	strive	to	ensure	such	individuals	receive	the	
same	standard	of	health	care	as	the	able‐bodied.		They	also	prohibit	discrimination	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 race	 or	 culture.	 	 Underpinning	 such	 instruments	 is	 recognition	 of	










the	 individual).20	 	 The	 case	 of	 Baroness	 Jane	 Campbell	 provides	 a	 concerning	
example	 of	 presumptions	 that	 can	 be	 made	 by	 doctors.	 	 Baroness	 Campbell	 has	
muscular	atrophy	and	was	rushed	to	the	emergency	department	one	evening	with	
severe	pneumonia.	 	 In	her	view,	doctors	were	not	prepared	to	treat	her	until	 they	



















conclusions	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 life	 of	 specific	 individuals	 may	 send	 a	 strong	
message	 to	 other	 individuals	with	 disabilities	 that	 their	 lives	 are	worth	 less	 than	
those	of	the	able‐bodied.22		
	
There	 is	 also	a	 risk	 that	 judgments	will	be	made	 that	discriminate	on	 the	basis	of	
race	 or	 culture.	 	 Health	 care	 professionals	 may	 see	 beliefs	 in	 non‐dominant	
treatments	 as	 completely	 irrational.	 	 They	 may	 see	 beliefs	 about	 the	 value	 of	
continued	 life	 (even	 in	 a	 persistent	 vegetative	 state	 for	 example)	 as	 being	
unreasonable.		This	issue	arose	in	the	Victorian	case	of	Re	Herrington23	in	which	the	
family	of	Ms	King,	an	Aboriginal	woman	in	a	persistent	vegetative	state,	disagreed	
with	 the	 health	 care	 team’s	 decision	 to	 discontinue	 treatment,	 including	 the	
provision	of	antibiotics	and	artificial	nutrition.		The	family’s	position	was	grounded	
in	part	in	Aboriginal	beliefs	in	the	provision	of	food	and	drink	and	‘caring	for	people	




Careful	 attention	 must	 be	 paid	 to	 ensuring	 cultural	 competence27	 (or,	 as	 it	 is	
sometimes	 known	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 cultural	 safety)	 so	 as	 to	 protect	 and	 promote	
equality	with	respect	to	race	or	culture.		This	means	that	decision‐makers	in	the	face	
of	conflicts	between	doctors	and	patients’	 families	must	understand	(or	be	able	 to	
come	 to	 understand	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 proceeding)	 the	 relevant	 cultural	
components	 of	 positions	 being	 taken	 by	 others.	 	 Circling	 back	 to	 disability,	 they	
must	also	understand	(or	be	able	to	come	to	understand)	the	ways	in	which	people	


































A	 fundamental	 plank	 of	 the	 legal	 system	 in	 both	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 is	
adherence	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law.28	 	 There	 is	 no	universally	 accepted	definition	of	 the	
rule	of	 law.	However,	 the	Law	Council	of	Australia	has	 identified	a	number	of	key	
principles	which,	together,	articulate	its	understanding	of	the	rule	of	law.		The	first	






who	 lack	 capacity	 is	 not	 only	 complex,	 it	 is	 also	 at	 times	 uncertain,	 internally	




































Another	challenge	to	understanding	the	 law	relates	 to	the	complexity	of	 the	 law	in	
this	area.		The	more	complex	the	legal	principle,	the	greater	the	chance	that	the	law	
will	 not	 be	 understood	 by	 those	who	 are	 subject	 to	 it.	 	 The	 authors	 acknowledge	
there	are	 likely	 to	be	 intractable	complexities	 in	applying	 law	on	withholding	and	
withdrawing	treatment.	For	example,	there	is	a	need	to	regulate	various	situations	
such	 as	whether	 a	 patient	 has	 capacity	 or	 not.	 	 But	 other	 complexity	 arises	 from	












A	 final	 challenge	 to	understanding	 the	 law	 in	 this	 area	 is	 that	 the	meaning	of	 key	






Given	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 the	 Australian	 and	New	 Zealand	 legal	
systems,	and	the	current	challenges	posed	to	it	by	existing	regulation	of	decisions	to	





Another	 consideration	 that	 can	 be	 significant	 in	 cases	 involving	 withholding	 and	
withdrawal	 of	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 resources	 are	
finite.		Resources	of	all	descriptions	including	intensive	care	unit	beds,	dialysis	units,	
organs	for	transplant	are	in	limited	supply,	and	there	will	be	times	when	giving	or	










not	 immoral	 to	 ration	 resources.	 It	 happens	 frequently	 and	 it	 is	 necessary:	 no	
country	can	afford	to	provide	all	 that	 is	medically	possible	to	everyone.32	 	But	this	






and	 burdens	 across	 society’.33	 	 Smith	 has	 considered	 the	meaning	 of	 ‘distributive	
justice’	in	the	narrower	context	of	health	care,	and	notes	that	‘so	long	as	restrictive	





some	 individuals.	This	 includes	patients	who	want	and	request	 the	 treatment	 and	
even	those	for	whom	that	treatment	would	be	in	their	best	interests.		The	manner	in	





If	 we	 accept	 that	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 rationing	 of	 health	 care,	 we	 must	 engage	 in	
legitimate	processes	for	designing	resource	allocation	policies.36		The	policies	must	
be	 drafted	 in	 an	 open	 and	 transparent	 fashion	 with	 input	 from	 individuals	 and	
groups	 with	 the	 necessary	 expertise	 (with	 a	 broad	 understanding	 of	 expertise,	
including	experiential	knowledge).	 	Particularly	careful	attention	should	be	paid	to	






















doctors	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	 potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 must	 be	
subjected	 to	 rigorous	 equality	 analysis	 prior	 to	 approval.	 	 Further,	 once	 these	
policies	 are	 established,	 they	 must	 be	 challengeable	 in	 the	 courts	 or	 other	
adjudicative	 bodies	 (for	 example,	 for	 being	 discriminatory)	 and	 there	 must	 be	
regulation	of	the	process.	
	
When	 considering	 individual	 decisions	 about	 withholding	 or	 withdrawing	
treatment,	a	procedurally	 fair	decision‐making	process	 is	particularly	relevant	and	
important	because	of	the	benefits	that	come	from	adherence	to	the	‘hearing	rule’.37		
Broadly,	 the	hearing	rule	 requires	 that	a	person	has	adequate	notice	of	a	decision	
that	 is	proposed	 to	be	made,	 access	 to	 relevant	 information	and	sufficient	 time	 to	
consider	it,	and	an	opportunity	to	participate	in	the	decision‐making	process	and	be	
heard.38	 	 Procedurally	 fair	 decision‐making	 is	 important	 because	 it	 increases	 the	
quality	of	decision‐making.		When	all	relevant	information	is	shared	and	discussed,	
this	ensures	that	views,	assumptions	and	conclusions	can	be	rigorously	tested.39		An	





of	 life	 should	 promote	 the	 achievement	 of	 these	 outcomes.	 This	would	mean	 that	
decisions	 about	 not	 treating	 should	 not,	 at	 a	 minimum,	 occur	 in	 isolation	 or	 in	
secret.	 The	 value	 of	 procedurally	 fair	 decision‐making	 requires	 frank	 engagement	
with	 the	patient	or	his	or	her	 sdm,	and	 the	patient	 (or	 sdm)	would	be	part	of	 the	
properly	 informed	 decision‐making	 process	 about	 whether	 treatment	 should	 be	
stopped.	 	The	 importance	of	 the	 treating	 team	consulting	with	 the	patient	 (or	 the	





























of	 law	has	been	 identified	as	a	key	value	 in	our	 legal	 system,	but	 this	depends	on	
individuals	having	access	 to	 justice	when	 they	 feel	 their	 legal	 rights	 (or	 those	of	a	
loved	 one)	 have	 been	 infringed.44	 	 Taking	 a	 matter	 to	 court	 is	 daunting	 and	
financially	 prohibitive	 for	most	members	 of	 the	 community.	 	 Delays	 in	 obtaining	
redress	will	sometimes	mean	that	legal	recourse	is	not	a	practical	solution.			
	









noted	above)	and	 the	resources	of	 the	health	care	system	are	 limited	(as	noted	 in	




for	 the	 system	 to	 bear.	 	 It	would	not	 be	 practical,	 for	 example,	 to	 require	 that	 all	
decisions	to	stop	treatment	(whether	with	consent	or	not)	be	reviewed	by	a	judge	or	
tribunal.		That	said,	it	is	also	very	important	to	be	pragmatic	about	how	many	cases	
would	 actually	 not	 be	 able	 to	 be	 resolved	 through	 effective	 communication	





























by	 creating	 efficient	 and	 accessible	 ways	 of	 resolving	 disputes.	 	 One	 principle	 of	
access	to	justice	is	that	law	should	provide	a	framework	for	dispute	resolution	that	
reduces	 the	 need	 for	 judicial	 intervention.	 This	 is	 an	 efficiency	 point	 in	 that	
requiring	judicial	intervention	in	every	case	is	impractical	in	terms	of	time,	cost,	and	
scarce	legal	system	resources.		It	is	also	an	access	to	justice	issue	as	individuals	are	










An	 individual’s	 freedom	 of	 conscience	 is	 recognised	 both	 in	 Australia	 and	 New	



























withholding	 and	withdrawal.	 	 The	 health	 care	 professional	may	 feel	 that	 ongoing	
treatment	is	not	only	not	in	the	patient’s	best	interests	but	to	provide	the	treatment	
would	 run	 counter	 to	 the	 health	 care	 professional’s	 conscience.	 	 The	 provision	 of	
treatment	that	the	doctor	considers	to	be	futile,	 thereby	depriving	another	patient	




However,	 the	 request	 of	 a	 patient	 (or	 the	 patient’s	 sdm)	 for	 treatment	 may	 be	
motivated	 by	 their	 conscience	 (hence	 calling	 for	 the	 weighing	 of	 one	 person’s	
conscience	 against	 another’s)	 or	may	 be	 an	 expression	 of	 their	 autonomy	 (hence	
calling	 for	 the	weighing	 of	 one	 person’s	 conscience	 against	 another’s	 autonomy).		
We	 would	 argue	 that,	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 meet	 the	 request	 for	 treatment	
without	violating	the	health	care	professional’s	conscience	(e.g.,	by	transferring	the	
patient	 to	 another	 health	 care	 professional),	 this	 should	 be	 permitted,	 indeed	
facilitated,	 in	 the	 system.	 	 Beyond	 that,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 refusal	 of	 consent	 to	 the	
withholding	or	withdrawal	of	potentially	life‐sustaining	treatment	by	the	patient	or	
patient’s	 sdm,	 unless	 authorised	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	 by	 a	 court,	 the	 doctor	
should	be	compelled,	even	over	a	conscience	claim,	to	provide	treatment.		It	should	
also	be	remembered	that,	in	this	kind	of	case,	the	patient	is	already	in	a	therapeutic	





This	 approach	 to	 a	 doctor’s	 conscience	 (i.e.,	 overriding	 it	 in	 some	 circumstances	
when	the	value	of	respecting	it	is	overridden	by	the	harms	of	doing	so),	is	consistent	
with	the	law’s	approach	to	compelling	the	cessation	of	treatment	(even	where	that	





Humility	 arises	 in	 the	 context	 of	 considering	 who	 has	 privileged	 access	 to	 what	
information	 and	 who	 can	 best	 judge	 the	 various	 elements	 in	 the	 decision	 to	














withdrawal	 cast	 doctors	 as	 having	 the	 requisite	 knowledge	 for	 determinations	 of	
‘appropriate	 treatment’	 and	 ‘best	 interests’.	 	 Opponents	 argue	 that	 patients	
themselves	or	patients’	families	are	better	situated	to	judge	what	is	in	the	patient's	
best	 interests	 or,	 where	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 doubt	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	 patient’s	
families,	 that	 judges	 and	 tribunals	 are	 best	 situated	 to	 make	 the	 substituted	
judgment.	
	
There	 is	 a	 need	 for	 doctors	 to	 be	 humble.	 	 Doctors	 must	 realise	 that	 when	 the	
decision	 is	 at	 least	 partly	 an	 ethical	 one	 (namely,	whether	 the	 treatment	 is	 in	 the	
patient’s	best	interests,	or	is	‘worth	doing’),	they	do	not	have	privileged	access	to	the	
truth.	 	 They	 have	 relevant	 information	 and	 their	 opinions,	 while	 potentially	
illuminating,	should	not	be	determinative.53			
	
This	 should	 drive	 doctors	 to	 support	 a	model	 which	 recognises	 that	 others	 have	
greater	expertise	than	they	do	in	relation	to	what	specific	patients	want	or	what	is	
in	 their	 patients'	 best	 interests	 and,	 reflecting	 that,	 establishes	 others	 as	 the	
appropriate	 decision‐makers.	 	 Such	 decision‐makers	 may	 be	 a	 patient’s	 legally	
authorised	 sdm,	 court,	 tribunal,	 or	 policy‐makers.	 	 Such	 a	 model	 would	 require	
doctors	to	obtain	consent	from	the	patient	or	the	patient’s	legally	authorised	sdm,	or	
authorization	 from	 a	 court	 or	 tribunal	 where	 the	 treatment	 decision	 rests	 on	































The	doctors	wanted	 assisted	 ventilation	withdrawn	and	 the	parents	did	 not.	 	 The	






authorized	 Dr	 Choong’s	 application	 to	 the	 Board	 and	 required	 us	 to	
adjudicate.		That	was	our	authority.		The	answer	to	the	second	question	was	rather	





It	 is	 not	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 paper	 to	 provide	 an	 exhaustive	 description	 of	 the	
Australian	 and	 New	 Zealand	 law	 about	 a	 doctor’s	 obligation	 to	 provide	 medical	
treatment.		Such	an	analysis	has	been	undertaken	elsewhere.57		However,	in	order	to	
critically	review	the	regime,	both	in	terms	of	a	legal	critique	and	as	against	the	core	
values	we	 argue	 should	 underpin	 a	 legal	 regime,	 a	 brief	 description	 of	 the	 law	 is	
necessary	here.	
	




























making	treatment	decisions	 in	relation	to	patients.61	 	This	arises	 in	Australia	 from	
the	 general	 law	 of	 negligence62	 and	 in	 New	 Zealand	 principally	 from	 the	 Code	 of	
Health	 and	 Disability	 Services	 Consumers’	 Rights.63	 	 Where	 medical	 treatment	 is	
needed	 to	 keep	 a	 patient	 alive,	 reasonable	 care	will	 often	dictate	 the	provision	 of	









The	 first	 is	 that	 futile	 treatment	will	 be	 treatment	 that	 is	not	 in	 the	patient’s	best	
interests.	 	Accordingly,	 if	 the	court	agrees	with	a	doctor’s	assessment	of	 futility,	 it	




































The	 second	 basis	 is	 that	 stopping	 (or	 not	 providing)	 futile	 treatment	 will	 not	
constitute	 a	 breach	of	 the	 criminal	 law	duty	 to	 provide	necessaries	 of	 life.	 	 There	
have	 been	 two	 grounds	 for	 reaching	 this	 conclusion.	 	 	 The	 first	 is	 that	 if	medical	
treatment	 is	futile,	 it	could	not	be	regarded	as	a	necessary	of	 life.	 	 In	a	decision	by	
the	 New	 Zealand	 High	 Court,	 Auckland	 Area	 Health	 Board	 v	 Attorney	 General,66	







High	 Court	 in	 the	 same	 case.	 	 The	 Court	 concluded	 that	 even	 if	 the	 provision	 of	
artificial	 ventilation	was	 a	 necessary	 of	 life,	 contrary	 to	 the	 Court’s	 finding,	 there	
was	 a	 ‘lawful	 excuse’	 for	 not	 providing	 the	 treatment.	 	 The	 lawful	 excuse	 arose	
because	 it	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 ‘good	 medical	 practice’	 not	 to	 provide	 medical	
treatment	in	the	circumstances	of	this	patient.68			In	the	later	decision	of	Shortland	v	
Northland	Health	 Ltd,69	 the	 New	 Zealand	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 further	 considered	 the	
content	of	the	excuse	of	‘good	medical	practice’.		The	patient	here	was	a	63‐year‐old	
man	 with	 a	 long	 history	 of	 type	 II	 diabetes,	 end‐stage	 chronic	 renal	 failure	 and	









Shortland	explicitly	 rejected,	 as	a	general	proposition,	 the	need	 to	obtain	 the	 fully	
informed	consent	of	the	patient’s	family,	saying	only	that	the	‘appropriate	course	is	
to	 expect,	where	 circumstances	permit,	 that	 there	will	 be	 reasonable	 consultation	
with	 the	patient	and	such	members	of	 the	 family	as	are	available.’71	 	The	Court	of	
















appropriate	 in	 the	context	of	 the	proposed	removal	of	a	 life‐support	 system,	as	 in	
the	Auckland	case.’72		
	










sdm,	or	other	authorization,	 to	withhold	 treatment	 that	 they	consider	 to	be	
futile.	 It	 is	 unclear	 whether	 consent	 or	 other	 authorization	 is	 needed	 to	
withdraw	treatment	already	being	provided.	





In	 Queensland,	 the	 law	 described	 above	 has	 been	 modified	 by	 legislation	 if	 the	



































current	 law,	 we	 now	 turn	 to	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 issue	 of	





of	 life	 (value	 2.1).	 	 The	 duty	 to	 provide	 treatment	 that	 is	 in	 the	 patient’s	 best	
interests,	 and	 the	 requirement	 to	 provide	 a	 person	 with	 the	 necessaries	 of	 life	
underscores	 the	 value	 that	 the	 law	places	 on	 life.	 	Nevertheless,	 the	 common	 law	
world	also	recognises	that	the	value	of	life	is	not	absolute.	 	The	law	recognises	the	
right	 of	 a	 competent	 individual	 to	 refuse	 treatment	 that	 is	 required	 to	 keep	 that	
person	 alive.78	 	 That	 refusal	 may	 be	 either	 contemporaneous79	 or	 in	 advance	 of	
losing	capacity.80		It	also	recognises	that	for	a	person	who	has	lost	capacity,	in	some	



































The	 second	 value	 that	 the	 current	 law	 promotes,	 at	 least	 in	 Australia,	 is	 the	
(comparatively)	 efficient	 and	 cost	 effective	 framework	 for	 resolving	 disputes	 that	
may	 arise	 between	 doctors	 and	 family	 (relevant	 to	 value	 2.7).	 	 Although	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 in	 all	 Australian	 jurisdictions	 retains	 jurisdiction	 to	 determine	
disputes	 that	 may	 arise	 regarding	 treatment	 (and	 the	 Family	 Court	 can	 have	





Despite	 promoting	 these	 two	 values,	 the	 authors	 contend	 that	 there	 are	 many	
important	 values,	 articulated	 in	 the	 second	 section	 of	 this	 article,	 that	 are	 not	
promoted	 by	 the	 existing	 law	 in	 Australia	 and	New	 Zealand.	 	 The	 balance	 of	 this	
section	critiques	the	current	law	with	respect	to	the	withholding	and	withdrawal	of	
potentially	 life‐sustaining	 treatment	 against	 those	 values.	 	 We	 have	 grouped	 the	
concerns	with	the	current	approach	into	five	categories:	uncertainty	problems	that	






































even	 that	 brief	 examination	 of	 the	 law,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 to	
provide	 unequivocal	 statements	 because	 there	 continues	 to	 be	 some	 uncertainty	
with	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 law	 in	 this	 field.	 	 The	 obvious	 example	 is	 that	 in	 New	
Zealand,	 it	 is	 unclear	 whether	 family	 consent	 is	 a	 necessary	 criterion	 for	 good	
medical	 practice,	 and	 thereby	 for	 lawfulness,	 for	 withdrawing	 treatment	 that	
doctors	 consider	 to	 be	 futile.	 	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	Shortland	 v	
Northland	 Health	 Ltd85	 found	 that	 fully‐informed	 family	 consent	 ‘may	 have	 been	
appropriate	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 proposed	 removal	 of	 a	 life‐support	 system’.86		






where	 such	 a	 course	 represents	 good	 medical	 practice.	 	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	
whether	 compliance	 with	 good	 medical	 practice	 will	 be	 recognised	 as	 a	 lawful	




Uncertainty	 is	not	 surprising	 given	 that	 so	much	of	 the	 law	 in	 this	 area	has	 come	
from	the	courts	rather	than	the	legislatures.		Part	of	the	uncertainty	comes	from	the	




in	 R	 (on	 the	 application	 of	 Burke)	 v	 The	 General	Medical	 Council88	 in	 the	 United	




















The	 statement	 of	 the	 law	 in	 section	 3	 also	 reveals	 both	 complexity	 and	
inconsistency.	 	For	example,	different	 legal	bases	have	been	used	for	 justifying	the	
position	 that	 doctors	 are	 not	 obliged	 to	 provide	 treatment	 that	 is	 futile:	 	 such	
treatment	 is	 not	 in	 a	 patient’s	 best	 interests;	 or	 criminal	 liability	 does	 not	 attach	
because	 either	 futile	 treatment	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 of	 life,	 or	 the	 non‐provision	
represents	good	medical	practice	and	is	therefore	lawful.			
	
Further,	 in	 one	 jurisdiction	 (Queensland),	 the	 law	 is	 inconsistent	 as	 to	 when	
unilateral	 withholding	 or	 withdrawal	 of	 treatment	 may	 occur.	 	 Doctors	 may	
unilaterally	withhold	or	withdraw	under	the	common	law	for	adults	with	capacity	
and	for	children,	but	the	guardianship	legislation	of	that	State	means	that	consent	is	
required	 when	 the	 decision	 relates	 to	 futile	 treatment	 for	 an	 adult	 who	 lacks	
capacity.90			
	
Such	 complexities	 have	 arisen	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 common	 law	
through	the	difficult	and	urgent	cases	(a	famously	bad	method	for	making	law),	as	
well	 as	 through	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	 common	 law	 with	 legislation	 that	 had	 not	







complexity	 and	 inconsistency	 outlined	 above.	 	 Again	 as	 noted	 in	 section	 2.4,	 the	



















from	 ‘simply	 won’t	 work’	 (antibiotics	 simply	 cannot	 affect	 a	 virus)	 to	 not	 ‘worth	
doing’	 where	 ‘worth	 doing’	 is	 defined	 by	 such	 measures	 as	 varying	 lengths	 of	
survival,	 levels	 of	 quality	 of	 life,	 or	 likely	 chance	 of	 success	 of	 the	 intervention.92		
Normally	we	take	the	position	that	we	should	wrestle	definitional	challenges,	posit	
and	 defend	 a	 definition,	 and	 move	 on.	 	 However,	 here,	 we	 do	 not	 do	 so.	 	 The	
definitional	fight	has	been	going	on	for	more	than	20	years	and	is	still	not	resolved	
and	we	do	not	think	we	lose	anything	important	by	abandoning	that	fight.		Instead,	
we	 think	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 the	distinction	between	 futile(will	 not	 work)	 and	
futile(not	worth	doing).93		In	the	former	case,	doctors	alone	have	the	expertise	regarding	
whether	 treatment	 simply	 won’t	 work.	 	 They	 should	 remain	 the	 gatekeepers	 to	
ensure	such	treatment	is	not	given	to	the	patient.		As	there	will	never	be	consensus	




conditions	 doctors	 should	 have	 the	 authority	 to	withhold	 or	withdraw	 treatment	
without	consent	or	authorization	from	anyone	or	anything	else,	be	it	patient,	family,	





The	 inability	 to	 agree	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 futility	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 academic	
commentary.		In	a	recent	English	case,	the	Court	of	Appeal	expressly	acknowledged	





























It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 courts	would	 not	 be	 clear	 on	 this	 concept.	 	 As	 noted	
earlier,	it	is	the	subject	of	extraordinary	debate	within	the	academic	literature,	and	
there	are	countless	definitions	in	that	literature.97			But	contributing	to	the	confusion	
is	 indefensible.	 	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 as	 the	 concept	 of	 futility	 is	 critical	 in	 the	
medico‐legal	context	in	that	the	legal	duty	to	provide	treatment	currently	turns	on	











The	term	‘necessaries	of	 life’	 is	a	significant	one	in	the	legal	context.	 	As	described	
earlier,	a	doctor	may	have	a	duty	to	provide	a	patient	with	‘necessaries	of	life,’	and	a	
failure	to	provide	treatment	may	result	in	a	breach	of	that	duty,	potentially	exposing	


























treatment.	 	 Our	 perception	 is	 that	 judges	 have	 wanted	 to	 be	 able	 to	 say	 that	
unilateral	withholding	or	withdrawing	 treatment	 is	not	unlawful,	but	have	 run	up	
against	 the	 provisions	 imposing	 duties	 to	 others	 as	 a	 potential	 barrier	 to	 such	 a	
result.	 	 To	 circumvent	 this	 barrier,	 ‘necessaries	 of	 life’	 has	 been	 defined	 so	 as	 to	
allow	 the	withholding	or	withdrawal	of	 treatment	 that	doctors	 (and	often	doctors	
and	 family)	 would	 agree	 to.	 	 But,	 in	 doing	 the	 work	 through	 the	 definition	 of	





of	 ‘necessaries	 of	 life’	 can	 lead	 to.	 	 The	 court	 in	 Auckland	 Area	 Health	 Board	 v	
Attorney‐General98	 got	 tangled	 up	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘necessaries	 of	 life.’	 	 Justice	
Thomas	stated	that	artificial	respiration	is	a	‘necessary	of	life’	if	‘required	to	prevent,	
cure,	 or	 alleviate	 a	 disease	 that	 endangers	 the	 health	 or	 life	 of	 the	 patient’;99	 and	
treatment	is	not	a	‘necessary	of	life’	if:	
	











































of	 life.’	 	 It	 makes	 no	 sense	 to	 speak	 of	 artificial	 nutrition	 and	 hydration	 as	 not	 a	
‘necessary	 of	 life’	 where,	 but	 for	 its	 discontinuation,	 a	 patient	 in	 a	 persistent	
vegetative	state	might	live	for	five	years.		It	makes	no	sense	to	speak	of	an	artificial	
ventilator	 as	 not	 a	 ‘necessary	 of	 life’	 where,	 but	 for	 its	 discontinuation,	 a	 patient	
with	Guillain‐Barre	disease	might	live	for	ten	years.		Each	of	these	treatments	might	
not	 be	 considered	 necessary	 for	 a	 life	worth	 living	 (especially	 to	 the	 patient)	 but	



















One	 of	 the	 problems	 with	 the	 current	 legal	 framework	 is	 the	 role	 ascribed	 to	
medicine:	the	issues	are	rendered	entirely	clinical.	
	
As	 we	 have	 touched	 on	 already,	 a	 decision	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 provide	









that	 the	 decision	 is	 indeed	 a	 clinical	 one.	 	 Our	 concern	 is	 reflected	 in	 comments	
made	by	 the	New	Zealand	Court	of	Appeal	 in	Shortland	v.	Northland	Health	Ltd104	












The	Victorian	Civil	 and	Administrative	Tribunal	 in	Re	BWV107	also	 recognised	 that	
‘[the	 application]	 raises	 moral,	 legal	 and	 ethical	 questions	 of	 a	 profound	 and	
fundamental	 nature,	 questions	 literally	 of	 life	 and	 death	 ...’.108	 	 In	 Re	 SAJ,109	 the	
Queensland	 Guardianship	 and	 Administration	 Tribunal	 (as	 it	 then	 was)	 heard	
evidence	 from	an	 ethicist	 before	providing	directions	 in	 a	 contested	matter	 about	
whether	life‐sustaining	treatment	should	be	continued	or	withdrawn.	
	
It	matters	 a	 great	 deal	 if	 the	 judges	 reduce	 everything	 only	 to	 the	 clinical.	 	 If	 the	
issues	 are	 regarded	 as	 entirely	 clinical,	 there	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 deference	 to	
doctors.		If	it	is	recognised	that	issues	are	also	ethical	and	philosophical,	then	there	






The	 earlier	 point	 about	 the	 role	 of	medicine	 leads	 into	 the	 next	 concern	we	have	
that,	 under	 the	 current	 system,	 the	 starting	 point	 is	 to	 accept	 the	 doctor’s	
assessment	of	futility	rather	than	a	patient’s	or	sdm’s	assessment	that	life‐sustaining	
treatment	should	be	provided.		As	decisions	are	not	(or	should	not	be	thought	to	be)	
entirely	 clinical	 ones,	 we	 argue	 that	 this	 starting	 point	 is	misguided,	 and	 doctors	




















may	 discount	 diagnoses	 and	 prognoses	 based	 on	 ‘traditional	 knowledge’	 and	
experience	 in	non‐dominant	 cultures.	 	 For	 example,	 a	 patient’s	wife	might	believe	
that	traditional	Chinese	remedies	might	be	able	to	treat	her	husband’s	cancer.		She	
might	 reject	 the	health	 care	 team’s	position	 that	he	 should	have	a	do	not	 attempt	
resuscitation	order	placed	on	his	 chart.	 	 She	might	want	 full	 treatment	 for	 the	six	
weeks	 that	 she	 believes	 it	 will	 take	 before	 they	 can	 know	 whether	 the	 Chinese	





do	not	have	privileged	 access	 to	 values,	 as	 contrasted	with	 clinical	 conclusions	or	
‘medical	facts’,	and	what	is	in	a	patient’s	best	interests	is	not	merely	a	matter	of	their	




This	 problem	 can	 be	 exacerbated	 in	 circumstances	 of	 cultural	 difference	 between	
the	 health	 care	 professional	 and	 the	 patient	 and	 patient’s	 family.	 	 Values	 can	 be	
culture‐based	 and	 if	 a	 health	 care	 professional	 does	 not	 understand	 the	 patient’s	
culture,	 he	 or	 she	 may	 not	 understand	 the	 values	 at	 play	 for	 the	 patient.	 	 The	
Victorian	case	of	Re	Herrington,112	considered	earlier,	may	be	an	illustration	of	this.		
It	will	be	recalled	that	Ms	King	was	an	Aboriginal	woman	in	a	persistent	vegetative	
state.	 	The	 family	did	not	want	antibiotics	and	artificial	nutrition	 to	be	withdrawn	
because	of	 the	 cultural	 importance	of	 caring	 for	 the	unwell.	 	 The	Court	ultimately	
accepted	the	views	expressed	by	the	doctors	and	declined	to	interfere.		
	
Furthermore,	 some	 health	 care	 professionals	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 have	 biases	
regarding	disability	 in	 that	 they	may	value	 the	quality	of	 the	 life	of	 the	 individual	
lower	 than	 the	 person	 living	with	 the	 disability.	 	 The	 case	 of	 Baroness	 Campbell,	


















decisions	 about	 their	 treatment	 as	 they	 (or	 their	 sdm)	 are	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	
know	what	treatment	the	patient	wants	or	would	want.		The	framework	also	has	the	
potential	to	offend	the	value	of	humility	as	it	does	not	require	the	doctor	to	defer	to	
the	 expertise	 of	 others	 in	 the	 decision‐making	 process,	 and	 a	 doctor	 might	 be	
tempted	to	make	a	 treatment	decision	without	considering	 important,	non‐clinical	
factors.	 	As	decision‐maker,	 the	doctors’	 conscience	 is	 privileged	over	patients’	 or	
their	sdm’s	conscience.		Depending	on	the	approach	taken	by	individual	doctors,	the	
value	 of	 procedural	 fairness	 could	 potentially	 be	 compromised.	 	 A	 decision	 about	
treatment	that	is	made	by	a	doctor	without	consultation	with	the	patient	or	sdm,	or	
a	 consultation	 which	 occurs	 without	 comprehensive	 and	 effective	 disclosure	 of	




access	 to	 justice	 is	 not	 maximized	 (even	 in	 Australia	 where	 such	 disputes	 are	







This	 section	 deals	 with	 who	 should	 be	 responsible	 for	 certain	 actions.	 	 The	 first	
issue	concerns	who	should	be	required	to	take	action	when	doctors	want	to	stop	(or	
not	provide)	 treatment	but	 the	patient	or	sdm	wants	 it	provided.	 	The	second	 is	a	













they	 assess	 to	 be	 futile	 and	 the	 onus	 is	 on	 the	 patient	 or	 family	 to	 make	 the	
necessary	steps	to	challenge	that	decision.114			
	
We	 can	 identify	 four	 reasons	 why	 the	 burden	 of	 challenging	 a	 doctor’s	 futility	
assessment	should	not	rest	with	the	patient	or	sdm	but	rather,	the	onus	should	be	
on	 the	 doctor	 or	 institution	 to	 bring	 the	 action.115	 	 Firstly,	 the	 family	 will	 not	




offered.	 Secondly,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 aware	 that	 a	decision	 to	withhold	or	withdraw	
has	 been	 made,	 they	 would	 not	 necessarily	 know	 that	 they	 can	 challenge	 the	
decision	in	a	legal	forum.		Thirdly,	there	is	a	power	imbalance,	and	they	may	not	feel	
empowered	to	instigate	such	a	challenge	(and	possibly	may	feel	that	their	loved	one	






































further	 treatment	 would	 be	 in	 the	 patient’s	 best	 interests	 and	 wanted	 to	 stop	
aggressive	 treatment.	 	Without	 such	 treatment,	 the	patient	would	 surely	die.	 	The	







arguments.117	 	 In	addition,	 the	novel	or	rare	nature	of	these	applications	generally	
means	that	there	is	not	a	large	number	of	experienced	lawyers	to	be	involved.		How	
many	of	the	lawyers	involved	in	the	various	cases	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand	had	






not	 allow	 adequate	 time	 for	 judges	 to	 work	 through	 the	 legal	 arguments	 and	
prepare	carefully	drafted	reasons.	 	Despite	 the	growing	numbers	of	 these	kinds	of	
cases	arising	 in	Australia	and	New	Zealand,	 there	 is	no	equivalent	of	Airedale	NHS	
Trust	 v	 Bland,118  a	 case	 in	 which	 the	 relevant	 legal	 arguments	 have	 been	 fully	
explored	 and	 jurisprudence	 developed	 in	 detailed,	 lengthy	 and	 considered	
judgments.	The	limited	capacity	to	develop	the	law	in	a	carefully	considered	way	has	
been	 judicially	 recognised.119	 The	 uncertainty,	 inconsistency,	 and	 conceptual	
problems	with	the	law,	as	identified	earlier,	demonstrate	this	point.			
	
Finally,	 there	 is	a	human	cost	 to	developing	 law	through	 individual	cases.	 	Making	
law	on	 the	 backs	 of	 individuals	who	 are	 very	 ill	 and	 their	 families	who	 are	 going	
through	such	difficult	times	and	health	care	professionals	who	are	trying	to	do	what	
they	think	is	best	puts	a	huge	burden	on	all	of	them.	It	is	one	thing	to	have	to	go	to	














face	 of	 irreconcilable	 conflict	 between	 the	 health	 care	 team	 and	 the	 patient’s	












For	 the	 most	 part,	 the	 law	 asks	 doctors	 to	 make	 individual	 treatment	 decisions	
based	on	a	patient’s	best	interests	without	considering	resource	allocation	issues.122		
However,	we	know	that	that	is	not	what	happens.		Doctors	in	charge	of	departments	
with	 limited	 beds	 (e.g.,	 intensive	 care	 units)	 make	 resource	 allocation	 decisions.		
Sometimes	 these	 decisions	 are	 dressed	 up	 as	 decisions	 grounded	 in	 conclusions	
about	 the	 futile	 nature	 of	 the	 treatment,	with	 a	 denial	 that	 there	 is	 any	 rationing	
going	 on.	 	 However,	 except	 where	 the	 treatment	 is	 not	 able	 to	 help	 a	 patient	 (ie	
treatment	 is	 futile	 because	 it	 ‘will	 not	work’),	 there	may	 be	 a	 resource	 allocation	





The	 current	 system	 which	 does	 not	 separate	 the	 issue	 of	 allocation	 of	 health	
resources	 from	decisions	 about	 treatment	 in	 individual	 cases	offends	 the	 value	of	
distributive	justice.		The	system	fails	to	ensure	that	health	resources	are	distributed	
in	a	fair	way.		And	if	we	accept	that	resourcing	decisions	are	being	made	by	doctors	


























opinion	 that	 treatment	 is	 ‘futile’,	 not	 in	 the	 ‘best	 interests’	of	 the	patient	or	 is	not	
‘good	medical	 practice’	 or	 ‘appropriate	medical	 treatment’.	 	 And	while	 the	 broad	






developed	 through	 the	 courts.	 	 A	 comprehensive	 legislative	 model	 is	 preferable	
from	both	rule	of	law	and	access	to	justice	perspectives.		Courts	and	tribunals	would	
continue	to	have	a	role	in	resolving	disputes	about	what	should	be	done	in	the	face	





At	 the	heart	of	our	model	 is	a	 shift	of	decision‐making	power	 from	doctors	 to	 the	
patient	 and	 his	 or	 her	 sdm.	 	 This	 authority	 to	 decide	 is	 qualified	 (as	will	 be	 seen	
below)	and	can	be	challenged	but	 it	 represents	a	 starting	point	as	 to	who	has	 the	
authority	to	make	a	decision	about	treatment	or	non‐treatment.	 	Such	an	approach	
better	gives	effect	to	the	values	of	life	and	autonomy;	that	decisions	about	medical	
treatment	 begin	 with	 the	 patient,	 particularly	 where	 the	 proposed	 decision	 is	 to	
stop	 treatment	 leading	 to	 his	 or	 her	 death.	 	 This	model	 also	 better	 advances	 the	
value	of	 equality	 as	 it	 imposes	 a	barrier	 to	doctors	 inappropriately	determining	 a	
life	is	not	worthwhile	based	on	considerations	such	as	age	or	disability.			
	
Our	 approach	 establishes	 a	 legal	 process	 that	 promotes	 the	 values	 of	 procedural	
fairness,	access	to	justice	and	humility.		By	locating	the	decision‐making	power	with	
the	patient	and	sdm,	a	doctor	and	 the	health	system	need	 to	engage	with	 them	 in	
making	decisions	and	a	doctor	is	prevented	from	unilaterally	deciding	to	stop	or	not	
start	 treatment.	 	 Entrenching	 this	 process	 in	 the	 law	 requires	 the	 provision	 of	
information,	 discussion	 with	 a	 patient	 about	 possible	 treatment	 options	 and	








5.2		 Provide	 requested	 treatment	 that	 can	work	except	 if	 lawful	
excuse	
	
It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 article	 to	provide	 the	details	 and	mechanics	 of	how	






patients	 with	 the	 necessaries	 of	 life,	 and	 patients	 should	 be	 able	 to	 request	
treatment	that	 fits	within	this	definition.	 	As	noted	earlier	 in	this	article,	we	reject	
the	more	qualitative	approach	of	Thomas	J	in	Auckland	Area	Health	Board	v	Attorney	
General,123	 and	 instead	 recommend	 that	 this	 term	be	 defined	 in	 a	 common	 sense,	
factual	 manner	 to	 mean	 simply	 treatment	 that	 is	 necessary	 to	 sustain	 life.	 	 If	





This	 also	means	 that	 there	will	 be	 a	 duty	 to	 provide	 a	wider	 range	 of	 treatments	
than	presently	is	the	case,	but,	it	should	be	emphasised,	there	will	not	be	a	duty	to	
provide	 all	 treatment.	 	 The	 concept	 of	 treatment	 that	 ‘will	 not	 work’,	 such	 as	
antibiotics	 for	 a	 virus,	 was	 discussed	 above	 and	 such	 treatment	 will	 not	 be	 a	
necessary	of	 life	 ‐	 it	 is	not	 capable	of	 sustaining	 life.	 	This	means	 there	will	be	no	








necessaries	 of	 life	 be	 clearly	 articulated.	 	 These	 circumstances	would	 provide	 the	
















Existence	 of	 a	 valid	 statutory	 regime	 or	 government	 or	 institutional	 resource	
allocation	policy		
	
Earlier	 in	 the	paper	we	recognised	that	 there	are	 limits	 to	when	treatment	can	be	
provided.		Recognising	such	limits	is	consistent	with	the	value	of	distributive	justice.		




Rationing	may	 need	 to	 occur	 both	 at	 a	 governmental	 level	 through	 enactment	 of	
legislation	 or	 development	 of	 departmental	 policies.	 	 It	 may	 also	 occur	 at	 the	
institutional	level	through	hospitals	developing	policies	that	are	specifically	tailored	
to	 their	 own	 circumstances.	 	 This	 will	 no	 doubt	 be	 challenging.	 	 Broad	 and	












There	may	be	 some	situations	 in	which	 treatment	 is	 a	physical	 impossibility.	 	For	
example,	 there	 may	 be	 no	 dialysis	 machine	 or	 oncology	 services	 in	 the	 town	 in	
which	 the	 patient	 lives	 or	 can	 travel	 to.	 	 A	 doctor	 should	 not	 be	 liable	 for	 not	
providing	 the	necessaries	 of	 life	where	 it	 is	not	physically	possible	 to	do	 so.	 	 It	 is	
likely	that	such	conduct	would	not	be	unlawful	in	any	event,	even	without	an	excuse,	
as	 civil	 or	 criminal	 liability	 is,	 as	 a	 rule,	 not	 imposed	 for	 failing	 to	 do	 something	
which	 is	 impossible.	 Nevertheless,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 clarity	 and	 completeness,	 this	
















recognised	 earlier.	 	 A	 doctor	 should	 not	 be	 required	 to	 provide	 treatment	 to	 a	
patient	if	treatment	is	contrary	to	his	or	her	conscience,	 if	 it	 is	possible	to	transfer	








of	 which	 will	 have	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages.	 	 The	 first	 is	 that	 it	 is	 likely	 to	
result	in	more	communication	between	doctors	and	patients	and	their	sdms,	leading	
to	greater	transparency	in	decision‐making.		For	example,	under	our	model,	where	a	
patient/sdm	 is	 asking	 for	 treatment	 that	 simply	 will	 not	 work,	 doctors	 should	
explain	 this	 to	 the	 patient/sdm	 and	 indicate	 that	 they	will	 not	 provide	 it.	 	Where	
potentially	 life‐sustaining	treatment	exists,	but	 is	physically	 impossible	 to	provide,	
again	 they	should	explain	 this	 to	 the	patient/sdm.	 	Where	 there	 is	potentially	 life‐
sustaining	 treatment	 but	 provision	 is	 precluded	 by	 a	 valid	 resource	 allocation	
policy,	 they	 should	 again	 explain	 this	 to	 the	 patient/sdm.	 	 But	where	 there	 is	 no	
lawful	 excuse	 for	 non‐treatment,	 the	 doctor	 should	 offer	 the	 various	 treatment	
options	 to	 the	 patient/sdm,	 along	 with	 his	 or	 her	 professional	 advice	 as	 to	 the	
appropriateness	of	various	courses	of	action.		Under	the	current	law,	which	permits	
unilateral	medical	decision‐making,	some	of	these	discussions	can	be	avoided.		But	a	
shift	 in	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 how	 these	 decisions	 are	made	will	 promote	 greater	
engagement	by	doctors	with	patients	and	their	sdms.			
	
A	 disadvantage	of	 this	 first	 impact	 is	 that	 communication	 like	 this	will	 take	more	
time,	 and	 time	 is	 a	 precious	 commodity	 in	medical	 practice.	 	However,	we	would	
also	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 an	 advantage	 of	 a	 legal	 framework	 to	 formalise	 and	 promote	
good	 communication.	 	 Further,	 ethical	principles	 of	 good	medical	practice	already	
require	 patient/sdm	 participation	 and	 consultation	 in	 decision‐making126	 so	 the	
sorts	of	discussions	mentioned	above	should	already	be	happening	to	some	extent.			
	
A	second	 likely	 impact	we	can	 foresee	 is	 that	 increased	 information	sharing	and	a	
shift	 in	 decision‐making	 authority	may	 lead	 to	 a	 small	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	









patient	or	sdm	request	 for	 treatment	cannot	be	resolved,	 the	doctor	should	either	
transfer	the	patient	to	another	doctor	willing	and	able	to	provide	the	treatment	or,	if	
that	is	not	possible	(and	there	is	no	other	lawful	excuse	available),	continue	to	treat	
and	 seek	 authorization	 to	 withhold	 or	 withdraw	 treatment	 from	 a	 court	 or	 a	
tribunal.		The	vast	majority	of	disputes	that	currently	occur	are	resolved	by	effective	
communication.127		There	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	would	not	continue	to	
be	 the	 case	under	our	model.	We	would	argue	 that	 concerns	about	 the	 floodgates	
opening	and	a	large	volume	of	disputes	arising	are	misplaced.	
	
That	 said,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 number	 of	 disputes	 occurring	will	 be	more	 than	 at	
present	 where	 doctors	 can	 make	 decisions	 not	 to	 offer	 treatment	 which	
patients/sdms	 never	 know	 about,	 or	 make	 decisions	 that	 patients/sdms	 lack	 the	
resources	and	ability	to	challenge	through	a	formal	dispute	resolution	process.		But	
this	begs	another	question	–	are	those	decisions	ones	that	should	be	allowed	to	be	
made	 without	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 dispute	 being	 raised,	 discussed,	 and	 resolved	
through	more	formal	means?			
	
To	 say	 that	 more	 disputes	 requiring	 resolution	 is	 a	 bad	 thing	 in	 and	 of	 itself	




the	quality	of	decision‐making.	 	Our	view	 is	 that	 if	 there	 is	a	small	 increase	 in	 the	
number	of	cases	that	need	dispute	resolution,	that	cannot	be	said	to	be	a	bad	thing.		
If,	after	extensive	communication,	a	dispute	remains	where	a	patient	or	sdm	has	a	










of	values)	 that	we	argued	 should	ground	 the	 legal	 framework	 in	 this	 area.	 	Those	
values	were:	 life,	 autonomy,	 equality,	 the	 rule	of	 law,	distributive	 justice,	 fairness,	
access	 to	 justice,	 conscience	 and	 humility.	 	 We	 then,	 in	 section	 3,	 gave	 a	 brief	
overview	of	the	law	in	this	area	which	generally	concluded	that	doctors	are	granted	









that	are	 incompatible	with	common	sense	usage	of	 language;	 that	 the	 law	permits	
overreach	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 role	 of	 both	medicine	 and	 doctors	 with	 respect	 to	
decision‐making	 in	 this	area;	 that	 the	design	of	 the	 law	imposes	burdens	on	 those	
who	 should	 not	 have	 to	 carry	 them;	 and	 that	 the	 current	 law	 permits	 covert	
rationing.			
	
The	 model	 that	 we	 proposed	 in	 section	 5,	 based	 upon	 a	 shift	 from	 doctors	 to	
patients	 and	 sdms	 as	 decision‐makers,	 addresses	 our	 concerns	 about	 the	 current	
legal	 framework.	 	 We	 anticipate	 that	 some,	 perhaps	 many,	 will	 not	 endorse	 the	
suggested	approach.		Nevertheless,	we	advocate	this	model	to	further	the	important	
values	 that	 should	 underpin	 a	 legal	 framework	when	making	 decisions	 about	 life	
and	death.		We	also	predict	that	the	cultural	shift	this	model	requires	is	perhaps	not	
as	great	as	may	be	 imagined	at	 first	glance,	particularly	 for	doctors	who	currently	
engage	 patients	 and	 families	 in	 a	 genuine,	 meaningful	 and	 respectful	 way	 in	
discussions	about	treatment	at	the	end	of	life.		Our	hope	is	that	the	adoption	of	this	
model	 will	 improve	 outcomes	 for	 all,	 particularly	 better	 care	 for	 those	 who	 are	
dying	and	their	families.	
